Maybe there is a huge literature out there about intuition (or rational insight) as a source of justification and knowledge – but I didn’t read any paper on it yet. However, I have a promissory note to deal with questions surrounding this cognitive power. The fact is that every time I read a philosopher accepting or rejecting a certain thesis on the basis that it is intuitive or counter-intuitive, I feel uncomfortable. So, I’ll try to explain why that is so. At the same time, I would like to know if the reader of this post feels completely assured that intuition is a good source of justification and knowledge (you can feel comfortable to indicate papers dealing with this question).
Doubts surrounding intuition can arise when one is in the context of philosophical discourse. In such context, it is usual to present philosophical analyzes by means of propositions with the form:
x is A if, and only if, x is B,
or:
x is A only if x is B
where ‘A’ and ‘B‘ are predicates standing for relations and properties (or sets of relations and/or properties). Generally, it is said that beliefs in such propositions are justified a priori – by means of reasoning from justified premises, or by means of understanding the meanings of ‘A’ and ‘B’, or then by means of rational intuition. It seems it is not as clear how such beliefs are justified by intuition as it is when they are justified by reasoning and linguistic understanding – what is a rational intuition? What epistemic properties it has?
Nevertheless, philosophers in general make use of intuition to refute and endorse propositions with that form. The theoretical procedure of endorsing a proposition by means of intuition can be represented by the following argument-type:
(i) It is intuitive that x is A only if x is B
(ii) Therefore, x is A only if x is B
This argument-type is instantiated by, for example:
(i’) It is intuitive that, if S knows that P, then S has some degree of certainty with respect to P
(ii’) therefore, if S knows that P, then S has some degree of certainty with respect to P
In a similar way, there is a theoretical procedure in which one refutes a proposition by means of intuition that can be represented by the following argument-type:
(iii) It is counter-intuitive that x is A when x is B
(iv) Therefore, x is not A when x is B
This argument-type is instantiated by, for example:
(iii’) It is counter-intuitive that S has knowledge when S has a justified belief which is accidentally true
(iv’) Therefore, S does not have knowledge when S has a justified belief which is accidentally true
What kind of argument is that authorizing the passage from (i) to (ii) and from (iii) to (iv)? Clearly, the argument is not a valid one: it is possible for the conclusion to be false while the premise is true. It can perfectly be the case that P is intuitive and false, as it can perfectly be the case that P is counter-intuitive and true.
But there is another option for taking these arguments as good ones (that is, not ill-formed): they are inductively strong (or cogent as Feldman calls it in Reason & Argument). In that case, the thesis is as follows:
(IN) If it is intuitive that P, then P is probably the case
And, if (IN) is the case, the following epistemic norm can be derived:
(ENI) When P is intuitive to S, S is epistemically insured in believing that P
This epistemic norm does not require S to know/justifiably believe that (IN) is the case – intuition can play its justificatory role even if neither (IN) nor (ENI) are actually accessed by S. The worry about the epistemic status of (IN) is part of the epistemologist job, however, which wants to justify the epistemic norm (ENI). Now, my question is: how can the epistemologist justify (IN)? What reasons we have to believe it is true?
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Katia 12:23 am on April 20, 2012 Permalink |
Hi Luis, thanks for the exciting opportunity of discussion! First I have to confess: I know near to nothing about the epistemology of memory (let’s wait for Ricardo). But I’ll try to put in a few words how I see the infallibility of introspection beliefs works. When I have a belief that p I accept the proposition p as true. “I believe that p” is a first order belief that can be either true or false in the sense that it can fail to correspond to a fact. But when I introspect I come to believe that “I believe that p”. This introspection belief is infallible, it’s not possible that I could be wrong when “I believe that I believe that p” if I am now occurrently believing that p. There is no room for mistake in that case even if p is false. In your example, if I understand it correctly, the proposition object of introspection would be “I believe that I remember that p”. You said that (and I trust you) to remember is factive, so “I remember that p”, if it’s just the content of some memory of mine, cannot be a belief because beliefs are not factive, they are not facts, they are propositions that can be true or false. So I would have to have a first order belief that “I believe that I remember that p” and then, by introspection, “I believe that I believe that I remember that p”. Voilà! “I believe that I remember that p” can be false, but “I believe that I believe that I remember that p” can’t.
That’s how I see it. And you Luis? Hello Ricardo?
Luis Rosa 2:33 am on April 20, 2012 Permalink |
Kátia, the proposition object of introspection in the example is “I remember that p”, not “I believe that I remember that p” (not every introspective belief must have a doxastic attitude as the first-order state believed to hold). How that sounds?
Ricardo 5:42 pm on April 20, 2012 Permalink |
Luis and Katia,
There seems to be a kind of begging the question on the assumption that Luis did in the original case: first, the mere fact of “looking for a mental state” does not follow that there originates a belief that I remember that P even seeming to remember that P. Second, to infer that this process remember that P, in fact, as the epistemological theory of memory requires as a necessary condition for propositional recall, and not merely seem to remember that P is already a priori stipulation, because how could knowing, in advance, if P is the case or not? In the event that you have been, there would be no a false memory, and S to remember the fact that P (sorry the redundancy concept), and not just seem to remember that P, concluding, then, that belief would be given by introspection true, at least in this example. What do you think? I think it is legitimate to defend an introspective fallibility of the “S introspect P, but does not know that P” is appealing for some Gettier case type, where the epistemic luck also applies to purely private mental contents which do not share S any evidence of the same with another cognitive agent.
Luis Rosa 5:55 pm on April 20, 2012 Permalink |
Ricardo, I agree with you that the mere ‘look’ at a mental state does not necessarily generates a belief about that mental state (in this case, a memory state). But I’m not assuming this either. What I need for the example to work is the possibility of a cognitive agent having the belief, generated by introspection, that he remembers that p. What is wrong with it? Why introspection could not generate a belief with the content “I remember that p”?
I’m curious to know how we could design a Gettier-like counter-example to that infallibility thesis, Ricardo! Let me know your thoughts!
Katia 7:29 pm on April 20, 2012 Permalink |
Luis, you say that the proposition object of introspection would be “I remember that p”, right? Ok, let’s call it “m”, a first order belief. When by introspection S looks inside himself he finds that he is believing that “m”, and “I’m believing that m” is a second order (introspective) belief of S that cannot be false when S is occurrently believing that m, even if m is false. I just don’t see the logical space where, in this particular first person situation, there could be any kind of mistaken. What do you think?
And Ricardo, could you explain a little more about the Gettier case you think we have here?
Luis Rosa 8:56 pm on April 20, 2012 Permalink |
No Katia, in the example, when by introspection S looks inside himself he doesn’t find himself that he is believing that m – what he finds is m itself! Notice that when I believe that I remember that p, I’m having a belief about a certain state – a memory (which does not hold in the case presented). Not every introspective belief is about beliefs.
Ricardo 10:27 pm on April 20, 2012 Permalink |
Luis and Katia,
Introspection would generate the content of the belief “I remember that P” if and only if P was the case for the epistemological theory of memory (TEM) if it is false that P, S and P do not remember who did not believe that true and introspectively P recalls that, therefore, could not produce genuinely S introspective belief (true) “I remember that P,” where the truth value of “remember that P” is false. One possible Gettier case counter-example to the thesis that introspection following infallible knowledge of mental states presuppose introspective accidentally justified true belief that there would be a case of propositional knowledge, but to be fallible at the base, the evidence / reason would be misleading , something like “I feel toothache (I have evidence / reason to believe that I have toothache), but I’m not a toothache,” that which would cause the toothache would not the fact of being with toothache, but some other mental event confused and cognitively untraceable … Reading the précis of the book of Sven Bernecker, let a sentence for you (we) think: “Not only can you remember that without P believing that you remember, but you can remember that P without believing that which you remember, namely P”!
Luis Rosa 8:36 pm on April 21, 2012 Permalink |
Not sure I’m following you, Ricardo. Ok, I understand Bernecker’s thesis that I can remember that p without believing that p. But in order for my example to succeed, I just need the possibility of having a introspective belief with the content: “I remember that p”. How else could I justifiably believe that I remember that p, if not using introspection?
Katia 5:52 pm on April 21, 2012 Permalink |
Luis, if I understand it rightly m is a first-order mental state object of introspection. Being so I’ll try to make my point in a more clear way. For this I will use BonJour’s line of argumentation in his 2003, pp. 61-63. There he says “For example, I believe that I am presently having the occurrent belief or thought that foundationalism is more defensible than most philosophers think. This is a meta-belief about the existence of a certain first-order belief: its content is roughly the claim that I believe that foundationalism is more defensible than most philosophers think.” If we translate BonJour’s example in yours we would have this: I believe that I am presently having the occurrent belief or thought that I remember that p. Introspection’s object in this case is the acceptance of the proposition “I remember that p”, that I consider as a belief. In my view the belief I remember that p is a first-order belief, a memorial one in the sense that its source is memory (false one as you put it) not introspection. Introspection gives us the belief that “I am presently having the occurrent belief or thought that I remember that p”. This belief cannot be wrong when I am presently having the occurrent belief or thought that I remember that p. This is so, and I think BonJour put it very nicely: “Because of its non-apperceptive, constituent character, this ‘built-in’ awareness of content, as it might be described, neither requires any justification itself, nor for that matter even admits of any. The first-order belief itself does, of course, require justification: I need a reason, […], for thinking that it is true that foundationalism is more defensible than most philosophers think. But there is no comparable issue of justification that arises for the intrinsic awareness of this content that I have simply by virtue of having the first-order belief in an occurrent, conscious way […]. Indeed, such a non-apperceptive, constituent awareness of content might be said to be strictly infallible […]. Since it is in virtue of this constitutive or ‘built-in’ awareness of content that the belief is the particular belief that it is with that specific content that it has, rather than some other belief or some other sort of state, there is apparently no way in which this awareness of content could be mistaken – simply because there is no independent fact or situation for it to be mistaken about”.
I think BonJour’s view is in the right track, but it’s indeed a tricky issue!
And Ricardo, enlight me please: you said that I can introspect memories only if they are true? If this is so when I remeber that p but p was never the case I am just by introspection considering a false proposition? I got it right?
Luis Rosa 8:29 pm on April 21, 2012 Permalink |
no again! In my example we don’t have: I believe that I am presently having the occurrent belief that I remember that p. What we have here is just this: the cognitive agent (in the case, myself, but you can replace me for the variable ‘S’) believes he is remembering that p. Again: it is not a belief about a belief. It is a belief about another cognitive state – a memory (which actually doesn’t hold, and that’s because it is a false belief). Hope I’m making myself clear – thanks for your points, Katia!
Luis Rosa 8:31 pm on April 21, 2012 Permalink |
another way to say the same thing: the belief that I remember that p is the introspective belief I’m talking about.
Katia 9:45 pm on April 21, 2012 Permalink |
Oh Luis… I think we need a little more theory on that, unfortunately it’s not that simple! You see, as I understand it the situation of your proposition “I remember that p” is exactly the same as the proposition “Foundationalism is more…” in BonJour’s example. You do the maths. And maybe it would be useful to look closer BonJour’s ideas about that in the book I quote.
Luis Rosa 11:04 pm on April 21, 2012 Permalink |
Ok, you’re right – what I presented here is just a sketch. Nevertheless, I think that “I remember that p” is a kind of belief I could have by means of introspection, which is not the case for “Foundationalism is more…” or any proposition that does nor refer to mental states. Now, let me make you a set of questions: Do you agree that remembering is a mental state? If remembering is a mental state, when I have a belief about such a state, isn’t it a belief generated by means of introspection?
Ricardo 2:53 am on April 23, 2012 Permalink |
Luis, I’m not sure necessarily conceive of memory as a mental state: Bernecker if you have any reason with your perspective on representational memory, propositional memory there can be no faith, and if a belief is a mental state of “take” something like true or false, the mental attitude, which would also propositional in this case, there would be a belief, but purely representational, in reading what I do Bernecker. Therefore, under this view, the introspection would generate not a belief but rather a representation. There is no other way I believe I remember rightly that P is not through introspection, but introspection does not necessarily cause such a belief in the cognitive agent. Katia, the epistemological theory of memory could not introspect memories with false propositional content (not properly memories: the propositional memory is necessarily factual), but if Sven Bernecker is right (and I contend that he may be at least partially…), non-propositional representational mental states could be remembered, since he is a critic of the standard theory, but would not be known, if memory conceive without belief, justification and knowledge.
Katia 1:29 pm on April 23, 2012 Permalink |
Nice discussion guys! Ok let’s take baby steps now. (and I repeat: Ricardo I need your help when I talk about epistemological problems of memory!) First, remembering is different from mere believing from memory because it’s factive, but its grounds are in memory as a faculty. Being so when I have an episode of thinking about something I remember (an object or an event) and this content (maybe not in a propositional form) is a conscious one then, I have it occurrently in my mind and I consider it and assume a doxastic attitude relatively to it, I may immediately form a belief, if I accept this content as being true. The content of this belief would be the proposition “I remember that p”, and this belief is grounded on the faculty of memory, not in introspection. If I misremember p my belief is false. When I consider introspectively that memorial belief – that is an internal fact – I form an introspective belief about it. Because I am directly in cognitive contact with this internal fact, I am directly acquainted, if you wish, with it, therefore there can be no room for error. An important point here: sure I can by introspection consider mental stuff other than beliefs, but I am not convinced that it is our case here. In order to see why it isn’t, just make the parallel with sensory experience and perceptual beliefs. We usually have perceptual beliefs about our sensory experience and they are not introspective ones because their grounds are in our perceptual faculties. The crucial idea here is the intrinsic awareness of these mental states allowing us to form first order perceptual and memorial beliefs that are justified by perception and memory. And finally, the memorial belief “I remember that p” is false, but the introspective belief I form when I consider it is true and cannot be false.