Tiegue Rodrigues
Claudio
valcarenghi
mssilva77
Rafael
fmmuller
CONTEXTUALISM, PREFACE PARADOX AND SKEPTICAL PARADOX
Hi guys,
Read the Paper here. I am still working on it, comments are welcome.
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Tiegue Rodrigues
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Tiegue Rodrigues
Out Now!!!! The Book “Ensaios Sobre Epistemologia Contemporânea”
Hi Folks,
Out Now!!!! The Book “Ensaios Sobre Epistemologia Contemporânea” (English Title: Essays in Contemporary Epistemology).
This is a collection of essays that aim to offer an overview of the contemporary epistemological debate for speakers and readers of Portuguese language.Be Good!
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Tiaraju
Table of contents?
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Luis Rosa
here it is, Tiaraju:
- A justificação do conhecimento: duas perspectivas internalistas (Albertinho Luiz Gallina)
- Indução como inferência à melhor explicação (Alexandre Luís Junges)
- Ceticismo: justificação e fechamento (Alexandre Meyer Luz)
- Sobre a viabilidade do fundacionismo moderado (Carlos Augusto Sartori)
- Figuras ambíguas e a distinção entre ver e ver como (Eros Moreira de Carvalho)
- Deontologismo: o argumento do involuntarismo doxástico (Felipe de Matos Muller)
- Episteme e logos no Teeteto de Platão (José Lourenço Pereira da Silva)
- Fundacionismo clássico e fundacionismo neoclássico (Kátia Martins Etcheverry)
- O positivismo lógico e o projeto de uma epistemologia exata (Luiz Henrique de Araújo Dutra)
- Sobre crenças, justificação e aceitabilidade: funderentismo e falibilismo (Remi Schorn)
- Coerentismo e “trustworthiness” em Keith Lehrer (Rogel Esteves de Oliveira)
- Matemática e conhecimento no Tractatus logico-philosophicus (Rogério Saucedo Correa)
- Diferentes abordagens sobre o contextualismo epistemológico (Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues)
- Infinitismo e justificação epistêmica (Tito Alencar Flores)
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Lucas are discussing. 
Tiaraju are discussing. 
Lucas 1:58 pm on May 29, 2011 Permalink |
wow, you wrote a lot in a short time, tiegue!
I would like to make some comments . I have no idea about what is a ” pragmatic inconsistency”. I know i’ve sent you the article from Jacquette, but there are some deep problems there.
And there’s a second point. I think the knowledge version of the preface doesn’t can’t be about inconsistency. There are two reasons (1) an inconsistent set of premisses can’t be known ( even in a contextualist perspective), because knowledge is factive ; (2) the premisse number 7 can’t be justified on the basis of achance of error. It’s much more plausible to think that a chance of error can only justifie ” S doesn’t knows that ( S1 & S2… & Sn) “, instead of ” S knows that ~ (S1 & S2… & Sn) “. It’s easy to see why. An salient possibility of error ( you can think about the skeptical hypothesis, for exemple ) is a undercutting defeater, not a rebutting defeater.
Tiegue And His Elusive Thoughts 2:33 pm on May 29, 2011 Permalink |
Hi,
There was a mistake with the numbers of the premises in (AP*), but now I have corrected it.
Well, I was thinking about pragmatic inconsistency in a way that the subject is required to do something in order to restore the consistency, but maybe it is really a unhappy term.
First, the premise (2) is not justified just by a chance of error. it is justified by the reviewer’s testimony that one of his beliefs is false – say, a very reliable testimony, something that in ordinary situations we would be willing to count as a justified belief, consequently, as a knowledge item. So what you said – “that premise (3) can’t be justified on the basis of a chance of error” – is not what I am saying. I am saying that you have a reliable testimony that at least one of Razoaldo’s beliefs is false.
Second, of course that a set of inconsistent beliefs cannot be known, that is the point. You can’t Know all the premises at the same time, that is the paradox; that is what is happening in the skeptical paradox and that is what is happening in the (AP*), you cannot known all the premises at same time, but each premise considered individually are very intuitively plausible and we would be willing to consider it as true in different contexts and as I said in ordinary contexts each claim would be considered as justified (and consequently as a knowledge item.
Lucas 5:41 pm on May 29, 2011 Permalink |
i think i misunderstood the example. One thing is a mere conjecture of error, other is the positive evidence that there is actually one. But sometimes you seem to use both ideas, when you write , for example, about ” contextual shifts imposed by the salience of the error possibility” . Anyway, iIf you use positive testimonial evidence of error( and not mere hypothetical possibility of error), then it does make much more sense. But then i could say that what has been changed is the total evidence razoaldo has( he didn’t have the testimonial evidence before, but now he has it… ) Is there any contextual change of knowledge standards, or just different background evidence ?
Tiegue And His Elusive Thoughts 7:52 pm on May 29, 2011 Permalink |
Hi,
Actually, my goal was to formulate a version of the preface paradox that could be suitable for a contextualist response. What I was arguing for is that, in (AP*), Razoaldo has justification for belief in both junctures and, by ordinary standards, the justification he has would be enough to amount to knowledge. So, assuming closure, it would be possible for him to justified believe, or to know a contradiction – and, obviously, this is a bizarre consequence.
I am arguing that there is a contextual change. Whether the new evidence he acquired ( by testimony) in order to justified believe in ~(c1 &…$cn) would suffice to undermine his justification for justified believe in (c1 &…$cn) is another question, and I am not sure about it.
Anyway, I don’t think that this issue is a problem for me here. As I said, I am just trying to formulate a version of the preface paradox that could be suitable for a contextualist response.
Luis Rosa 11:27 pm on May 31, 2011 Permalink |
Tiegue, I don’t get it: “In ordinary contexts in which the standards are more relaxed the premise (3) will be true and (2) will be false. In skeptical contexts in which the standards are extraordinarily demanding the premise (2) will be false and the premise (3) will be true”
the sentence is saying the same thing twice – both cases, the relaxed and the demanding one, are cases where (2) is false and (3) is true. As I understand it, in the demanding context S does not know she is not seeing a painted mule and also doesn’t know she is seeing a zebra.
is that right?
Nice point guys. I just keep in my mind a doubt already expressed by lucas: isn’t the supposed contextual change just a change at the body of evidence?
cheers! =]
Tiegue And His Elusive Thoughts 12:17 pm on June 1, 2011 Permalink |
Luis,
I think is pretty much as you said. According to contextualism: In ordinary contexts, relaxed standards, (2) is false and (3) will be true (contrary to what the skeptic claims); and in extraordinary contexts, demanding standards (3) will be false (as the skeptic claims) and (2) will be true.
Your question: isn’t the supposed contextual change just a change at the body of evidence?
My answer: If you are talking about the preface paradox, then I would say that in the version I have formulated the problem is not about a mere change in the body of evidence. Obviously, I am not denying that there is some change in the total evidential body, but I don’t see what is the big deal about this, because I don’t think that in this case one evidence is enough to defeat the other (if this is what you have in mind).preface paradox is stated Razoaldo has, respectively, evidence to rationally believe in each premise.
Luis Rosa 8:16 pm on June 1, 2011 Permalink |
right, so:
[contextual change entails evidence change]
but:
it is not the case that [there is contextual change if, and only if, there is evidence change]
is that ok?
Tiegue And His Elusive Thoughts 8:28 pm on June 1, 2011 Permalink |
Actually, contextual changes does not involve and does not entail any change in the evidence. I do not think that contextualism is committed to this, and there is no need for that. In the skeptical argument, for example, when the skeptic makes the error possibility salient the context is automatically raised, but there is no change in the evidence.