~(E = K)?

Ram Neta (in this paper, p. 100) in the business of fleshing out a good propositionalist account of evidence, points out that the evidence set of propositions must be such that Continue reading →

Some notes about the semantics for (PL)

In general, textbooks about propositional logic (PL) don’t make it clear that the formal language used has such-and-such semantics. Of course, most of them present truth-tables in order to show how Continue reading →

Some Fallacies

Reading this post, I re-realized how important it is for us to think hard about argument fallacies. With more and more people discussing their views, be it on the world-wide-web Continue reading →

Epistemology for the Whole World

  Hello dearest readers (yes, I’m asking for something), I’m currently working on quantifying the extent of the universality of our knowledge intuitions. Or at least I’m trying to get Continue reading →

Defining background beliefs

Epistemologists sometimes deal with what is commonly called “background beliefs” or “background assumptions”. There are some other concepts like those expressed by “operational beliefs” and “dispositional beliefs” which are sometimes Continue reading →

An obvious case of infallibility

Epistemologists frequently stumble upon the question if there is any  proposition at all which can be infallibly believed. Our *skeptical training* teaches us to doubt any alleged certainty on any Continue reading →

is this a counterexample to the closure principle about justification?

I’m reading Peter Klein’s Certainty: a Refutation of Skepticism. In chapter 2, Klein considers these two epistemic principles used by the skeptic in the Evil Genius Argument: Contrary Consequence Elimination Continue reading →

Is introspection infallible?

Yesterday, during Claudio Almeida’s class, Katia Etcheverry presented a paper on the Internalism/Externalism debate. At a certain point of the presentation, we had a very exciting debate about the infallibility Continue reading →